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FIRST AMENDMENT DECISIONS IN THE OCTOBER 2005
TERM
Joel Gora*

One important theme of the 2005 Term, as Professor
Chemerinsky previously mentioned, is the decreasing docket size of
the Supreme Court this past Term and in recent years. I think of this
theme as it relates to the First Amendment,'

as a minimalist

phenomenon.
First of all, the Court only decided three First Amendment
cases, a minimal number as compared to recent years.2 Naturally,
since the Supreme Court's docket has declined in numbers, of course
the number of First Amendment cases has declined as well. While
there were a number of cases that involved First Amendment matters
tangentially, in terms of core First Amendment concerns or issues,
there were only three cases on the docket.

* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; B.A., Pomona College; LL.B, Columbia
University School of Law. This Article is based on a transcript of remarks from the
Eighteenth Annual Supreme Court Review Program presented at Touro Law Center,
Huntington, New York.
U.S. CONST. amend. I provides that: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances."
2 For First Amendment cases decided during the October 2005 Term, see Rumsfeld v.
Forum for Academic and Inst. Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006), Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006); Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006). Yet, during the
October 2003 Term, the Supreme Court decided approximately six First Amendment cases.
See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2003), Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004),
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88 (2004), Elk Grove
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542. U.S. 1 (2004); City of Littleton v. Z-J. Gifts D-4 L.L.C.,
541 U.S. 774 (2004).
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Second, another interesting aspect of the October 2005 Term,
is that there was a range of interpretations of prior decisions that
related to the depth of the First Amendment's coverage. One end of
the range gives First Amendment rights a minimal view, while the
other gives them a broader view. In two of the three cases decided
this past Term, the Court went for the minimal end of that range by
rejecting the application of various First Amendment precedents and
principles to the case at bar. 3 Finally, the one case that the First
Amendment prevailed is the campaign finance case. 4 I have been
working with the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") for
thirty years challenging limits on campaign financing, and I do not
see two sides on the broad issue. In my opinion, there is only one
side to this case, the First Amendment side. The Court's decision,
even though it is saying it is a First Amendment claim, is a
minimalist approach.

It is certainly not a swashbuckling opinion,

although the First Amendment claim was sustained.

3 See FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1313 (holding that a finding in FAIR's favor would
"exaggera[te] the reach of our First Amendment precedents"); Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1962
("We reject ... the notion that the First Amendment shields from discipline the expressions
employees make pursuant to their professional duties.").
4 Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2500 ("We conclude that Act 64's expenditure limits violate the
First Amendment ....

We also conclude that the specific details of Act 64's contribution

limits require us to hold that those limits violate the First Amendment, for they burden First
Amendment interests in a manner that is disproportionate to the public purposes they were
enacted to advance.").
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INTERPRETING THE FIRST AMENDMENT'S PROTECTIONS
FROM A MINIMALIST STANDPOINT

A.

Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional
Rights

Let me first turn to the case that is significant to us law
professors.

The case is Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and

Institutional Rights ("FAIR").5 It involved a group of law professors'
challenge to the Solomon Amendment. 6
You are aware that the Solomon Amendment requires that all
educational institutions, colleges, and universities that receive the
billions and billions of dollars of federal funding distributed to them
are required to give military recruiters access to their campuses.7
While the Solomon Amendment went through various permutations,
it is the final version that essentially caused a number of law
professors to join a group called FAIR, the Forum for Academic and
Institutional Rights to do battle with that law. FAIR brought suit to
challenge the Solomon Amendment as violative of a number of
related First Amendment rights. The case involves a version of that
old adage, he who pays the piper calls the tune. Here, he is the
federal government, it writes checks for trillions every year and
billions for educational institutions. The piper is the colleges and
universities that receive the checks, and the tune is that you have to
let the military come on campus and recruit.
' FAIR, 126 S.Ct. 1297.
6 Solomon Amendment, 10 U.S.C. § 983 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
7 Id.; see also FAIR, 126 S.Ct. at 1302 (explaining that the Solomon Amendment requires
"that if any part of an institution of higher education denies military recruiters access equal
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The requirement was challenged by law professors who had a
particularly close relationship to the issue.

The military has the

policy of "don't ask, don't tell," which the official organization of
law schools viewed as a discriminatory policy against gays and
lesbians.

The official organization of law schools requires law

schools not to facilitate work by any employer who discriminates
against gays and lesbians. Law school procedures operate against the
Department of Defense's military services "don't ask, don't tell"
policy because of the discrimination perpetuated by the policy. Law
schools are required not to participate or cooperate with employers of
that kind.

However, under the Solomon Amendment, these

institutions have to cooperate with discriminatory employers or they
will lose all federal funding. Further, it is not just the funding that
relates to the law school that is at risk, but the whole of the
university's federal funding.
The claim in FAIR was basically that the imposition of the
requirement of having to permit military recruiting as a condition of
getting federal education funding violated the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine.

The unconstitutional conditions doctrine

provides that while an individual may or may not have a right to a
certain benefit, a government cannot seek to deny an individual that
benefit for reasons that will infringe upon or require the surrender of
an individual's constitutionally protected rights. 8
to that provided other recruiters, the entire institution would lose certain federal funds.").
8 See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 528-29 (1958) (a person, otherwise
qualified, could not be denied a tax exemption for refusing to sign a defective loyalty oath,
even though there was no "right" to the tax exemption). See also 16A AM. JUR. 2d
ConstitutionalLaw § 395 (2006).
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The Solomon Amendment's requirement is an example of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine. However, the Court held that
the Solomon Amendment was not an unconstitutional condition. 9
Interestingly, the Court took the case out of the unconstitutional
condition funding situation and basically found that the federal
government could simply and directly demand that all colleges and
universities make themselves available to military recruiters as part
of its national responsibility for raising an army, and wholly apart
from imposing that requirement as a condition of receiving federal
funds.

0

Therefore, universities cannot claim that the government has

no right to require that military recruiters be on campus as a
prerequisite for receiving funds "[b]ecause the First Amendment
would not prevent Congress from directly imposing the Solomon
Amendment's

access

requirement

....

"

Hence,

the

unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the notion that the government
cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, did not apply in FAIR
because the government could take direct action to require military
recruiters access.12 The unconstitutional conditions doctrine really
was found to be basically irrelevant in FAIR.
Another related First Amendment doctrine that law professors
know well has to do with the notion of the compelled speech or
association.

You may remember from law school that the First

Amendment guarantees both the right to speak and associate, and
9 FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1307 ("It is clear that a funding condition cannot be unconstitutional
if it could be constitutionally imposed directly.").
"o Id. at 1306-07.
" Id. at 1307.
12 Id.

922
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also guarantees the flip side-the right not to speak or be compelled
to speak, the right not to associate in certain circumstances, and the
right not to have the government require that you associate with
persons that you choose not to. 13

Therefore, the law professors

argued that by imposing military recruitment on the campus, the
schools would be in effect required to sing the military's tune, to
speak the military's words and to support the military's conduct.
According to the law professors, this violated their rights to be free
from participation in speech or ideas that they found unacceptable.
There were a number of similar cases you may remember
from the World War II era that applied this principle, for example,
that recognized the right of Jehovah's Witnesses to refuse to stand
and salute the flag was especially held as a First Amendment right. 14
More recently, the right of someone not to have the license plate from
New Hampshire, which says "Live Free Or Die," was viewed as a
5
First Amendment right, to resist that right to speech. 1
Similarly, the professors in FAIR argued that, based on such
precedents, they and the schools had the right to resist.

But the

Supreme Court rejected that right and as a number of conservative

13 See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (finding the

Board of Education's resolution that required participation in a flag salute violated the First
Amendment); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 661 (2000) (holding that the anti-

discrimination statute violated the Boy Scout's First Amendment right to freedom of
association); Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S.
557, 573-75 (1995) (holding that the State of Massachusetts could not require a private

group that conducts the St. Patrick Day parade to include gay, lesbian, and bisexual groups
to march under their own banner because the organizers have a First Amendment right to
refuse the inclusion of another group's message).
14 See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642; Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583, 589 (1943).
15 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977).

20071
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6
pundits pointed out, this was an eight-to-nothing decision.' The law

professors could not get a single Justice to agree with their position.
In rejecting the professors' theory, the Court explained that the
government was not compelling law schools to say something or
support something they did not agree with; the Solomon Amendment
simply requires that the government receive the same incidental
administrative assistance that all other employers receive, which does
not compromise the right to be free from compelled speech. 17 By the
way, the Court observed, do not forget you can turn down the money
if you find the government condition offensive. Of course, it turns
out that this really would not matter, since the Court said the
government can come onto campus anyway, money or not."

After

all, Congress passed the statute based on that principle. Further, the
Court explained that the notion of the right to resist compelled
speech, was by no means even incidentally involved in this case, and
was rejected on a First Amendment basis. 19
The other right worth mentioning is the right to resist
association. 20 Ironically, this right had been recognized and extended
in two cases where gay rights groups or individuals were seeking
16 FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1308 (stating that unlike the Barnette and Wooley cases, "[t]he

Solomon Amendment does not require any similar expression by law schools.").
17 Id. ("The Solomon Amendment ... does not dictate the content of the speech at all,
which is only 'compelled' if, and to the extent, the school provides such speech for other
recruiters.").
"8 Id. at 1306 ("[Military recruiters must be given the same access as recruiters who
comply with the policy.").
19 Id. at 1308 ("The compelled speech to which law schools point is plainly incidental to
the Solomon Amendment's regulation of conduct .... ).
20 See, e.g., Dale, 530 U.S. at 644, 647-48 (recognizing a "right of expressive association"
under the First Amendment and stating that "[t]his right is crucial in preventing the majority
from imposing its views on groups that would rather express other, perhaps unpopular,
ideas.").
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access to various institutions and were denied that access. 2 1 In one

case, gay rights groups wanted to march in the St. Patrick's Day
parade

and were precluded.22

In the other case,

a

state

antidiscrimination law was held to prevent the Boy Scouts from
excluding gay scout masters.23

Both of these cases went to the

Supreme Court and in both cases the Court held the organizations
that sought to exclude, namely, the parade organizers and the Boy
Scouts, had a right to freedom of association-to be free from
government compelled and forced associations in these settings.

4

These precedents were being invoked by gay rights advocates
in FAIR to say that for similar reasons the government cannot compel
association with the military by requiring recruiting functions and
associations. The Supreme Court explained that those cases involved
association for overtly political or cultural purposes and attempts to
compel membership in an organization as a prerequisite to march in
the parade.25

The Court distinguished those cases, where the

government was seeking to directly impose a position upon private
21 See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 557; Dale, 530 U.S. at 654.
22 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 559 ("[Requiring] private citizens who organize a parade to include
among the marchers a group imparting a message the organizers do not wish to convey ....
violates the First Amendment.").
23 Dale, 530 U.S. at 644.
24 Id. at 654; Hurley, 515 U.S. at 559. In Dale, the Court compared the rights of the
parade organizers to the rights of the Boy Scouts in the Hurley decision:
As the presence of GLIB in Boston's St. Patrick's Day parade would
have interfered with the parade organizers' choice not to propound a
particular point of view, the presence of Dale as an assistant scoutmaster
would just as surely interfere with the Boy Scouts' choice not to
propound a point of view contrary to its beliefs.
Dale, 530 U.S. at 654.
25 See FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1309, 1313 ("The expressive nature of a parade was central [to
the Court's] holding in Hurley," and that "the law schools' effort to cast themselves as just
like the ... parade organizers in Hurley, and the Boy Scouts in Dale plainly overstates the
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organizations, from the instant case, where the government's position
incidentally affects expression.26
The interesting matter of fact is that various First Amendment
doctrines were advanced as a basis for resisting military recruitment
on campus. The Court, nonetheless, chose to interpret those prior
decisions that formed the doctrinal basis at the narrower end of the
precedence scale, and thus rejected the application of those doctrines
to this case and sustained the Solomon Amendment.27 I think it was
quite significant that even the more liberal justices of the Court did
not give a concurring opinion or dissenting opinion from that
decision.
B.

Garcetti v. Ceballos

The second significant case mentioned previously, Garcettiv.
Ceballos,28 is the case involving speech in an official public
employee capacity.

I will not revisit the Garcetti decision in its

entirety, and only wish to make a few important points.
Garcetti is an important and complex decision. If you have a
chance to review the whole opinion, there is a good deal of sniping
back and forth in the countering of arguments between the majority
and dissent.29 It is a bit surprising that the Court took a categorical
expressive nature of their activity .....
26 Id. at 1313.
27 Id. ("Because Congress could require law schools to provide equal access to military
recruiters without violating the schools' freedoms of speech or association, the Court of
Appeals erred in holding that the Solomon Amendment likely violates the First
Amendment.").
28 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
29 E.g., id. at 1963 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[I]t seems perverse to fashion a new rule that
provides employees with an incentive to voice their concerns publicly before talking frankly

926
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view that some kind of speech by public employees done in one's
official capacity is basically off limits to the First Amendment,
period.3 °
In trying to explain the complicated rules framed by the Court
in a straightforward way, I have come up with the following
assessment. According to the Supreme Court, speech at the public
workplace-at the job-may still be protected, but speech on the job
is now virtually immune from any First Amendment inquiry. 31 The
Court said maybe there can be statutory or regulatory whistleblower
protection put in place instead.32

Statutory and regulatory

whistleblower protection exists in some federal, state and local
statutes.33 Unfortunately, prior to Garcetti it seemed like the ultimate
whistleblower protection was the First Amendment.
Importantly, the Pickering v. Board of Education34 line of
cases said that public employees as citizens have a right to speak
about matters of public concern and if they do, then you have to

to their superiors"); id. at 1967 (Souter, J., dissenting) (asking "why do the majority's
concerns, which we all share, require categorical exclusion of First Amendment protection
against any official retaliation for things said on the job?"); id. at 1962 (majority opinion)
(rejecting Justice Souter's suggestion in the dissent, that Garcetti would affect cases
involving teaching or scholarship).
30 Id. at 1961 ("[T]he First Amendment does not prohibit managerial discipline based on
an employee's expressions made pursuant to official responsibilities.").
31 Id. at 1957-60 (stating that the First Amendment protects an employee's right, in certain
instances, to speak as a citizen about matters of public concern, or in some cases where the
employee expresses himself at work, but that the First Amendment does not protect public
employees' statements made pursuant to their official duties).
3 Id. at 1961-62 (stating that the Court will not intervene in the conduct of governmental
operations, and this decision is notably exemplified by such whistleblower protection laws
and rules of conduct which are in place to protect employees and provide checks on
supervisors).
33 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (2000); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8547.8 (West 2006); CAL.
PROF. CONDUCT RULE 5-110 (2006).

14 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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balance their interest in speaking against whatever effect their speech
may have in the workplace.35 Certainly misconduct in a prosecutor's
office having to do with an allegedly faulty affidavit is a matter of
public concern.

But after Garcetti, if you speak internally about

workplace misconduct in an official way, through a memo or a
similar form of communication, then you cannot claim that any
subsequent action against you as an employee is in retaliation for that
protected activity.36 I do think that will have a negative effect on the
ability of public employees to speak out on these kinds of important
issues.
I can understand that the Supreme Court did not want to
become the national public employee personnel board. But surely an
approach where the Court would continue to balance the employee's
speech interest against the employer's concern with the orderly
conduct of public business would have been the best way to reconcile
the competing interests on a case-by-case basis, as compared to the
one-sided, categorical rule that the Court fashioned.
II.

DECISIONS DISCUSSING FIRST AMENDMENT RELATED
ISSUES: HARTMAN V. MOORE AND BEARD V. BANKS

There are two other cases that I will just mention briefly.
Although they are not core First Amendment cases, they tangentially

35 Id. at 568 (holding that the First Amendment protects a public employee's right, in

some instances, to address matters of public concern, and it is necessary to balance the
interests of a public employee in speaking about matters of public concern and "the interest
of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of public services it performs
through its employees.").
36 See supra note 31.
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involve the issue. Hartman v. Moore37 deals with a related matter, a
claim of retaliatory action by the government against a speaker. A
person indicted for mail fraud claimed that the indictment resulted
from his criticism of postal authority activity and policy. 38 The
criminal defendant brought a Bivens 39 civil damage action, that is the
federal constitutional damage action comparable to a § 198340 suit
against state or local officials. 4 ' There are some key questions on
what kind of matters must be proved by a Bivens retaliatory claimant.
But since the underlying claim was a First Amendment claim, that he
spoke out and for that he was prosecuted, I think it is important to
note it as a First Amendment issue. Unfortunately, the Court upheld
a stiffer pleading requirement on this plaintiff, which resulted in
another First Amendment case being lost by a claimed whistleblower.
The other First Amendment case I want to mention briefly is
Beard v. Banks, 42 a prison case. There is general agreement that
prisoners do not have the same First Amendment rights as the rest of
3 126 S.Ct. 1695 (2006).
38 Id. at 1700 (stating that the prosecutors and inspectors had manufactured a criminal
prosecution as revenge for Moore's criticism of the Postal Service).
39 Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
40 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) provides in pertinent
part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State .

.

. subjects, or causes to be subjected,

any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
41 Hartman, 126 S. Ct. at 1700 n.2 (stating that a Bivens action is the equivalent of
bringing an action against state officials under § 1983). Notably, "Bivens established that the
victims of a constitutional violation by a federal agent have a right to recover damages
against the official in federal court despite the absence of any statute conferring such a
right." Id.
42 126 S. Ct. 2572 (2006).
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As an old New Yorker carton indicated, being in prison does

carry a general lack of amenities, and the Court, in this case, had to
decide whether restrictions on prisoners in possession of newspapers,
magazines, and photographs were consistent with the reduced First
Amendment protection available to prisoners.
Between the six Justices in the majority, including two

concurring opinions, and the two Justices in the dissent, there was no
real disagreement about the standards to apply.4 3 However, there was
disagreement

about the application

in this case, whether the

possession of First Amendment materials posed any danger to
4
prisoner security to justify their being suppressed.

Another important aspect I note about Beard is that Justice
Thomas concurred. In his concurrence, Justice Thomas revisited the
basic premise of prisoners'

rights and concluded that the only

provision of the Constitution that should apply to prisoners is the
46
Eighth Amendment,4 5 the ban on cruel and unusual punishment.

43 Justices Breyer, Kennedy, Souter, and Chief Justice Roberts were in the majority. Id. at

2577-78. The Court stated that the proper standard to apply is the one espoused in Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 87 (1987), which held that restrictive prison regulations are permissible
so long as they are reasonably related to legitimate penal interests. Id.; see also id. at 2588
(Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (stating that the Turner standard applies). Only the
two concurring justices seemed to disagree about the applicable standard. See id. at 2582-83
(Thomas & Scalia, JJ., concurring) (declining to apply the Turner standard because it rests
on the presumption that the Constitution contains a definition of incarceration, and since
such a definition is absent, states are free to define incarceration as they wish).
44 Id. at 2586-87 (Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (stating that the plurality had failed
to discuss whether the possession of First Amendment materials posed any danger to prison
security to justify being suppressed, and that the Justices believed there was no evidence at
trial to support the justification and therefore the security interest does not warrant
judgment).
45 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII states in pertinent part: "Excessive bail shall not be required.
. nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
46 Beard, 126 S. Ct. at 2582-83 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., concurring) (explaining that the
States have broad power in defining imprisonment, and that the only requirement is that the
deprivation the state chooses to implement cannot deprive the prisoner of his Eighth

930
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The First Amendment and other rights, which the Court has applied
in the prison setting over a generation, were really not applicable,
except to the extent that the deprivation could create an Eighth
Amendment violation.47

He was joined in that original view by

Justice Scalia.
III.

UPHOLDING THE FIRST AMENDMENT'S APPLICATION TO
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS AND EXPENDITURES: RANDALL

V. SORRELL

The third and final significant First Amendment case after the
FAIR Solomon Amendment case and the Garcetti public employee
case is the campaign finance case, Randall v. Sorrell.48

Notably,

there is also another related case Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v.
49

FEC.

First, I would like to issue an important disclosure. I worked
on the Randall case for the American Civil Liberties Union
("ACLU"). I helped write the briefs in that case and was present
during the oral argument.

The case involved the challenge to

Vermont's contribution and expenditure limits, which were extremely
low.

The campaign contribution limits were challenged on the

Amendment rights).
47 id.
48 Randall, 126 S. Ct. 2479.
49 126 S. Ct. 1016 (2006) (involving the "Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002"
which "prohibits corporations from using their general treasury funds to pay for any
'electioneering communications' "). In this case, within barely a week of oral argument, the
Court summarily reversed the district court's refusal to entertain an "as applied" challenge to
the law by a non-profit advocacy organization engaged in grass roots lobbying which
referred to federal officeholders who were also up for election. Since then, that lower court
held that the Act was unconstitutional as applied to certain lobbying broadcast
advertisements, and the Court has once again agreed to review the case. See 75 U.S.L.W.
1389 (Jan. 9, 2007).

2007]
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grounds that low contribution limits made it very hard for a particular
challenger to raise enough funds to get their message out to the
public. That was the issue in Randall.
One noticeably important aspect of oral argument was that the
initial questioning of the lawyers in the case came from Justice
Stephen Breyer, who perceived Vermont's restrictions as so low that
it could make it hard for a candidate to raise enough funds to get his
or her message out. 50 Justice Breyer, who had expressed his views
on the bench in his opinions and off the bench in a long essay on
"active liberty," seemed to believe that there were two sides of the
First Amendment issue: one to restrict speech, and the other to
encourage fair and open balanced debate.51
Our side, the challenger's side, was concerned about how
Justice Breyer would vote in the case. When he started the active
questions about the problems with the Vermont law, we believed that
we would have a chance to prevail in the case. That is precisely what

50 Justice Breyer made the following comments to Mr. Sorrell, the respondent:
It's not going to help to say incumbents had a bigger advantage before.
That is . . . what we're interested in is . . . at what point do these

[contribution limits] become so low that they really, as a significant
matter, shut of the possibility of a challenge.... I'm talking about the
contribution limits. I and my friends have the following thought. We
don't know who the candidates for State rep are, but we want a
Republican slate or we want a Democratic slate. So we get all our $ 5
together, give them to the Democratic Party or the Republican Party in
Vermont, and lo and behold, that party cannot give more than $100 in an
election to a State rep, et cetera. Now, to the-to the ear, that sounds as
if a challenger or a slate of challengers or a party that wants to challenge
is going to have a really tough time. So I want you to explain it.
Transcript of Oral Argument at **31,32, Randall, 126 S. Ct. 2479 (Nos. 04-1528, 04-1530,
04-1697), 2006 WL 560656.
"' Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2491-92, 2499-2500.
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happened-the Court held the Vermont law to be unconstitutional.

52

Randall essentially revisited and reaffirmed the decision of
Buckley v. Valeo 53 thirty years after it was decided. Buckley was the
first major case to decide whether the First Amendment would permit
the government to impose limits on campaign ftnding.5 4 In Buckley,
the Court dealt with a federal statute passed in the wake of
Watergate, which had put very significant limits on the ability of
candidates, parties, committees, and organizations to raise and spend
monies in political campaigns. The limitations were challenged as
restrictions of free speech and free association on the ground that the
less money you can raise and spend, the less speech you could
support and generate.

The Supreme Court came down with a

Solomon-like, splitting of the baby, decision which did not work out
as well as Solomon's decision.
In Buckley, the Court said that limits on spending money are
at the core of the First Amendment, because spending is speech.5 5
Hence, according to the Court, if you cannot spend, you cannot
speak. If the law says nobody can spend more than $1,000 a year on
political speech, this means that an individual cannot run more than
one advertisement in the newspaper and you have to be silent. The
Court said that while limits on campaign spending are unacceptable,
limits on campaign contributions are more tolerable because giving
52 Id. at 2500.
5' 424 U.S. 1, 51, 54 (1976) (holding that the Federal Election Campaign Act's
restrictions on campaign contributions were constitutional while its expenditure limits were
unconstitutional under the First Amendment).
14 Id. at 13-15.
55 Id. at 16 (explaining that communication which is expressed through spending money
can either involve speech, conduct or a combination of the two).
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money is one step removed from spending and extensive campaign
contributions could result in undue influence.56 Thus, while holding
that contribution limits are acceptable, the Court held that campaign
expenditure limits placed "substantial and direct restrictions on the
ability of candidates, citizens, and associations to engage in protected
political expression, restrictions that the First Amendment cannot
tolerate.,

57

Well, this so-called

split decision has caused

many

difficulties. Candidates can spend as much as they can raise, yet they
can only raise funds in limited amounts. Therefore, they are hoping
to raise money outside of those controls. As a result we had soft
money, which is money raised and spent by rich individuals, by labor
unions, corporations, and the like, all allegedly trying to influence the
political process in some fashion, but outside the restrictions and
controls of the campaign laws.
A number of states and localities have said that they think
Buckley is wrong and the Court should have allowed not just limits
on contributions but also limits on spending in order to have balanced
campaigns.58

So a few places, notably Vermont, passed statutes

designed to set up a test case to revisit Buckley by imposing very low
limits on both spending and giving in elections. 59 The spending limit
56 Id. at 20-21, 23 (stating that even though spending is speech, limitations on campaign

contributions do not limit political speech because the contributor may still discuss political
candidates and issues).
" Id. at 58-59.
58 Randall, 126 S.Ct. at 2489. Respondents, state officials, in Randall, claimed that
limiting campaign contribution without limiting expenditure limits "cannot effectively deter
corruption or its appearance ....Id.
59 Id. at 2486. Vermont's statute, Act 64, set mandatory limits on both expenditures and
contributions. Id.
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for state assembly was $2,000, which would barely buy a person
dinner for eight where I come from. And that applied for a two-year
election cycle.
Similarly, the contribution limits were down to as low as
$200, which also applied to an entire two-year election cycle. Thus,
if your college roommate was running for state assembly, and you
wanted to give him a $250 check fully disclosed, you could not
lawfully do it. The political parties were limited to the same $200
contribution. If a party raised $10,000, a dollar at a time from its
supporters, it could not give more than $200 to any one candidate.
These problems with the statute-in terms of the limits on giving and
spending-were not troublesome to the majority of the Second
Circuit, which upheld the constitutionality of both the contribution
60
and the spending limits.
A new theory had developed post-Buckley, that the Second
Circuit thought was relevant in Randall. The theory is that raising a
lot of money is going to take away an office holder's time and
energy.

According to this theory, candidates need to be worried

about the business of government, not raising money. In Randall, we
were not convinced that this issue was enough to justify reducing
candidates and their campaigns to effective silence.
The Vermont statute posed a head-on challenge to the rules on
campaign limits, in terms of contribution limits and spending limits,
60 See Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91, 124-25 (2d Cir. 2004), rev'd sub nom. Randall, 126

S. Ct. 2479. The Second Circuit decided that the spending limits were supported by two
government interests-preventing corruption and preserving candidates time-and that the
two interests, when taken together, were sufficiently compelling that the spending limits
might be constitutional, if the statute were sufficiently narrowly tailored to advance those
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and went to the Supreme Court with that posture. While the makeup
of the Court and what the future may hold has already been
discussed. What is interesting in the result is that the Court did two
things. First, the Court upheld Buckley as far as no spending limits
are concerned, and struck down Vermont's spending limits. 6' The
Court said that Buckley worked pretty well and there is no viable
reason to change it. Spending limits are not going to be allowed.62
Second, for contribution limits, which is basically read as a
six-three decision, the Court held that the limits were too low. 63 On
this particular issue there were three Justices who indicated that they
were unhappy with as much regulation as we now have, and they
might be willing to eliminate limits on giving money, that would be
Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Scalia. 64

Then there were three

Justices who were uncertain, Justices Breyer, Roberts, and Alito.65
Finally, there were three Justices who had indicated a willingness to
allow greater regulation of political funding, and those were the
liberal Justices, Justices Ginsberg, Souter, and Stevens.66

The

plurality of the Court said that under Buckley the limits might be so
low that they would make it hard to have a campaign of any
two interests. Id.
61 See Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2500.
62 Id.
63 Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Breyer, Kennedy, Thomas, and Scalia made up
the plurality. Id. at 2494-95 (explaining that Act 64's contribution limits were substantially
lower than the limits the Court had previously upheld); id. at 2501 (Kennedy, J., concurring);
id. at 2506 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., concurring).
64 Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2501 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See also id. at 2502-06 (Thomas
& Scalia, JJ., concurring).
65 Id. at 2492-93 (plurality opinion) ("As compared with the contribution limits upheld by
the Court in the past, and with those in force in other States, Act 64's limits are sufficiently
low as to generate suspicion that they are not closely drawn.").
66 Id. at 2512, 2515 (Souter, Ginsburg, & Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
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effectiveness for particularly a challenger, and we think these are too
low. 67

Contribution limits do not permit effective campaigning, nor

do they permit effective competition.68 Justice Breyer said in his
plurality opinion that because he worried about the effect of low
contribution limits on political competition, this was a valid reason
for striking down the limits. 69
So three Justices allow greater limits, three Justices would
allow less limits, and the three Justices in the middle said our current
Buckley regime is probably fine. In Randall, the plurality held that
the contribution limits were too low, so the Court struck them
down. 70 However, Buckley said you cannot have spending limits and
the Court followed Buckley in holding that Vermont's expenditure
limits violated the First Amendment. 7 '
Thus, the case will be remanded to the same world in the area
of First Amendment and campaign finance that we had the last thirty
years. The only way in which there may be a change in the future,
since very low limits are not going to be upheld, is increased interest
in public funding of campaigns. That is the one area where the Court
said that you can impose limits as a condition of receiving public
funding, although that strikes me as problematic as well.7"
67 Id. at 2495 (plurality opinion) ("[T]he record suggests, though it does not conclusively
prove, that Act 64's contribution limits will significantly restrict the amount of funding
available for challengers to run competitive campaigns.").
68 See id. The election prior to when Act 64 took effect was analyzed; the statute's
"contribution limits would have reduced the funds available in 1998 to Republican
challengers in competitive races in amounts ranging from 18% to 53% of their total
campaign income." Id.
69 Randall, 126 S. Ct. at 2499-2500.
71 Id. at 2500.
"1 Id. at 2499-2500.
72

See id. at 2490 (explaining that the Court in Buckley approved the public funding law in
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Some purists like me think that this may be a violation of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine.

But the result of the Court's

striking down expenditure limits in the Vermont case may be of more
interest in public funding when you get a lot of money from the
government to run your campaign, but you cannot spend any more
than you get.

That kind of regime may be an alternative to

mandatory limits. Under Randall, mandatory limits on spending are
still not allowed, and very low limits on giving will not be allowed
either. 73
Only time will tell whether the Court will stay in the middle
on campaign funding and the First Amendment-where it has
basically dwelled for 30 years--or whether the two newest Justices
will tack toward one end of the spectrum or the other.
And those are the First Amendment decisions in the October
2005 Term. Thank you very much.

the statute at issue because it was intended to "relieve Presidential candidates 'from the
rigors of soliciting private contributions' " (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 91)). In Randall,
the act created a voluntary public financing system and any requirements of that system were
not challenged. Id.
73 Id. at 2500. The Court concluded that "Act 64's expenditure limits violate the First
Amendment as interpreted in Buckley v. Valeo." Id. The Court also concluded that "the
specific details of Act 64's contribution limits . . . burden[ed] First Amendment interests in a
manner that is disproportionate to the public purposes they were enacted to advance." Id.

